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Abstract—Social Media involve many shared items, such as
photos, which may concern more than one user. The first
challenge we address in this paper is to develop a way for users
of such items to take a decision on to whom to share these items.
This is not an easy problem, as users’ privacy preferences for the
same item may conflict, so an approach that just merges in some
way the users’ privacy preferences may provide unsatisfactory
results. We propose a negotiation mechanism for users to agree
on a compromise for the conflicts found. The second challenge we
address in this paper relates to the exponential complexity of such
a negotiation mechanism, which could make it too slow to be used
in practice in a Social Media infrastructure. To address this, we
propose heuristics that reduce the complexity of the negotiation
mechanism and show how substantial benefits can be derived
from the use of these heuristics through extensive experimental
evaluation that compares the performance of the negotiation
mechanism with and without these heuristics. Moreover, we
show that one such heuristic makes the negotiation mechanism
produce results fast enough to be used in actual Social Media
infrastructures with near-optimal results.
Index Terms—Social Media, Privacy, Conflicts, Automated
Negotiation, Intimacy, Social Networking Services, Online Social
Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
DESPITE the unquestionable success of social media(Facebook recently achieved 1 billion users), privacy is
still one of the major concerns with regards to these technolo-
gies [1]. Moreover, this concern has even been increasing over
the last few years because users are more aware of the privacy
threats that social media entail [2]. Most social media users
consistently criticise mainstream social media for providing
very complex privacy controls. These are often too difficult
to understand, require time-consuming manual configuration,
and do not allow for appropriate privacy management. Users
are required to set many privacy controls (Facebook has 61
privacy controls [3]), they need to consider a huge space
of possible accessors (the average Facebook user has more
than 130 friends [4]), and they may have to perform fine-
grained modifications for many items (the average Facebook
user uploads 22 photos1). This makes most users unable to
cope with the complexity of privacy management in social
media, which has led to numerous incidents in which people
have lost their jobs, have been cyberbullied, or have lost court
cases due to the inappropriate communication of personal
information through social media. Empirical evidence shows
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that this significantly discourages users to either join social
media or to show high engagement when they join [5], in
terms of how much they participate in social media sites, e.g.,
the amount of photos they upload, the number of comments
they post, etc. Indeed, the most common case is the latter:
people usually join social media because they do not want
to be left apart, but after they join they do not participate
much because they are not able to manage their privacy in a
satisfactory way.
To address this problem, new access control paradigms
for social media have been recently proposed, such as
relationship-based access control [6], [7], [8]. These new
access control paradigms are aimed at better capturing the
nature of information sharing in social media by considering
users’ relationships as a central concept. This is supported by
many studies that provide evidence that user relationships are
the main factor that drives human disclosure of personal infor-
mation [9], [10], [11], [12], and that they should play a crucial
role when defining access control mechanisms for social media
[13]. In particular, privacy policies in relationship-based access
control are neither defined based on individual persons nor on
their roles, but on the relationships — and specifically the
strength of the relationships or intimacy — that a user has to
other users.
The main limitation of state-of-the-art relationship-based
access control models is that they only support single user
decisions [14]. That is, these proposals assume that only one
user takes the decision of whether or not to grant access to
an item. This user is usually the one who uploads the item
or shares it in some other way. However, what should we do
when the definition of a privacy policy involves more than one
user? This is an issue that arises frequently, for example when
photos depict different people so that the privacy preferences
of all of them should be respected when deciding who should
be able to view them. A solution to this problem is very
challenging, mainly due to the fact that: (i) a simple solution
would be to let users define their privacy preferences with
respect to an item and then merge individual preferences into
a joint disclosure policy, but there can be situations in which
privacy preferences may conflict and it may not be obvious
how to merge them; and (ii) detecting and solving conflicts
manually can be very complex and time-consuming because
of the number of possible shared items and the number of
possible accessors to be considered by users.
In this paper, we propose the first automated method to
detect privacy policy conflicts and resolve them using a nego-
tiation mechanism. The preferences that determine negotiation
behaviour are based on the strength of the relationships among
users. As proven by recent experiments [10], and in line with
state-of-the-art relationship-based access control mechanisms
[6], [7], [8], this is the most important factor that users con-
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2sider when deciding what information to disclose. Moreover,
our mechanism uses the well-studied one-step negotiation
protocol [15] and strategies which are known to be complete,
efficient and stable.
The second main challenge we address in this paper relates
to the inherent complexity of considering the space of all
possible deals users may achieve to solve the conflicts so that
the results are optimal. In particular, we show in this paper
that this space grows exponentially in the number of conflicts
that need to be negotiated for. This is very important because
this could prevent the mechanism from being used in actual
Social Media infrastructures, as it would be too slow for users
to be able to run the mechanism in real-time when they are
posting items in the particular Social Media infrastructure.
We overcome the complexity problem by developing a
number of suitable heuristics. The aim is to reduce the space
of all possible deals users may achieve to only those most
promising, so that the complexity is reduced while the outputs
of the negotiation mechanism remain near-optimal. Through
an extensive experimental comparison of the performance of
the negotiation mechanism with and without heuristics, we
show that they provide a significant search space reduction
while remaining near-optimal. One particular heuristic is able
to produce results very close to the optimal fast enough to be
used in real-world social media.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the concept of intimacy and policies for
relationship-based access control. Section 3 provides a brief
overview of the mechanism. Section IV describes the method
used to detect conflicts. Section V proposes the model for
ranking possible negotiation outcomes based on existing em-
pirical evidence. Section VI describes the negotiation mecha-
nism and its complexity. Section VII introduces the heuristics
we propose to reduce the complexity of the problem. Section
VIII presents the experiments we conducted and discusses
the results obtained. Section IX reviews the related literature.
Finally, Section X presents some concluding remarks and
describes possible avenues for future work.
II. BACKGROUND
We consider a set of agents Ag = N ∪ T , where a pair of
negotiating agents N = {a, b} negotiate whether they should
grant a set of target agents T = {i1, . . . , in} access to a
particular item it. For simplicity and without loss of generality,
we will consider only a negotiation for one item throughout
this paper – for example, a photo that depicts the two users
which agents a and b are representing – and hence, we do
not include any additional notation for the item in question.
The problem we are considering is how a and b can detect
whether their individual privacy preferences for the item are
conflicting2, and if they are conflicting, how a and b can
achieve an agreement on which agents in T should be granted
access to this item.
2Note that we focus on detecting conflicts once we know the parties that
co-own an item and have their individual privacy preferences for the item.
We are, however, not proposing a method to automatically detect which items
are co-owned and by whom they are co-owned. This is a different problem
that is out of the scope of this paper.
Negotiating agents have the individual privacy preferences
of their users about the item — i.e., to whom of their online
friends users would like to share the item if they were to decide
it unilaterally. Users could define their individual privacy
preferences about the item using any of the access control
models already proposed for Social Media3. In this paper,
we use relationship-based access control [6], [7], [8] because
this type of access control has emerged as an appropriate
way to capture the nature of individual sharing preferences
in Social Media, and because it makes the link between
individual preferences and our proposed mechanism more
intuitive. However, other approaches to access control in Social
Media — such as the group-based access control models of
mainstream Social Media infrastructures (like Facebook lists
or Google+ circles), or (semi-)automated approaches like [16],
[17], [18] — can also be used in conjunction with our proposed
mechanism, as we will be pointing out at different points in
this paper.
A. Intimacy
In modelling how agents’ preferences about disclosure are
formed, we base our analysis on the concept of relationship
strength (or intimacy4) between two persons [19]. This is
because in the domain of social networks, there is strong
evidence that the best predictor for individuals’ willingness
to share a particular item with another individual is how
close/intimate their relationship is [20], [12], [9], [10]. It is
important to note that intimacy does not equal social distance,
which is usually measured as the number of hops (friends)
between two users that are not necessarily directly connected
with each other. Instead, intimacy is the measure of the
relationship strength between two directly connected friends.
Intimacy can also be transitive under certain conditions [21],
so some particular non-directly connected friends may have
non-zero intimacy. The rest of non-directly connected friends
who do not meet the conditions to have a transitive intimacy
would have no intimacy at all — e.g., they would have an
intimacy value of 0.
We assume that we have available the intimacies among
users who use the particular social media service in which our
mechanism is to be deployed. This is a realistic assumption,
as intimacies can be accurately estimated from content users
have previously published, using tools that obtain intimacies
automatically for Facebook [22], [23]; Twitter [24]; and the
like. Even if these tools are not used, users can be asked to self-
report their intimacies to their friends, but this would obviously
mean more burden on the users. We formally represent the
intimacy of two agents as follows:
Definition 1: Given two agents a, b ∈ Ag, and a maximum
integer intimacy value Y , the intimacy between a and b is
given as int(a, b), where int : Ag ×Ag → [0,Y].
The maximum possible intimacy Y depends on the scale
used by the particular methods/tools used to obtain intimacy.
3Our approach does not even need users to specify their individual privacy
preferences for each and every item, users could specify their preferences for
groups or categories of items, e.g., users could specify the same preferences
for all the photos in a photo album.
4Over the course of this article, we shall use relationship strength, tie
strength, and intimacy as equivalents.
3For example, in Gilbert and Karahalios’ approach [22] Y =
100, and in Fogue´s et al. [23] Y = 5.
B. Relationship-based Policies
Privacy policies in relationship-based access control [6], [8]
consider the strength of the relationships (or intimacy) that
a user has to other social media users. In particular, privacy
policies define an intimacy threshold that users must have with
the user that defines the privacy policy to access the specific
item. For instance, if a user defines a privacy policy with a
high intimacy threshold, it means that only users who are very
close to this user can access the item. Privacy policies in this
approach also consider relationship types R = {r1, . . . , rn}—
e.g., family, friends, colleagues — so that a different intimacy
threshold is defined for each relationship type. Moreover, a
mapping r : Ag × Ag → R is defined so that r(a, b) is the
relationship type between agents a, b ∈ Ag.
Definition 2: A privacy policy is a tuple P =
〈θ1, . . . , θ|R|, E〉, where θj ∈ [0,Y] is the intimacy threshold
for the relationship type rj ∈ R, and E ⊆ T is the set of
exceptions to the policy.
We denote Pa as the preferred privacy policy of the user
which agent a ∈ Ag is representing.
III. MECHANISM OVERVIEW
The mechanism proposed proposed in this paper takes as
inputs the individual privacy policy of each negotiating agent
— Pa for all a ∈ N — and the intimacies among agents
— int(a, b) for all a, b ∈ Ag —, elicited as described in the
previous section. The mechanism has two stages, as shown in
Figure 1:
1) The individual privacy policies of the negotiating agents
are inspected to identify any conflict, as described in
Section IV.
2) If conflicts are found, then agents run the negotiation
mechanism described in sections V and VI to resolve
every conflict found.
Fig. 1. Mechanism Overview.
IV. PRIVACY POLICY CONFLICT DETECTION
In this section, we describe how conflicts between the
preferred privacy policies defined by agents a and b on the
item under consideration can be detected. Each agent usually
has different intimacies to other agents, so that two privacy
policies from two different agents can only be compared in
terms of their effects. For instance, suppose that agents a and
b have the same preferred privacy policies for a particular
item (i.e., these policies have the same intimacy thresholds
for the same relationship types). Suppose also that agents a
and b have different intimacies to agent i1 in T . If agent a
has an intimacy with i1 below the corresponding threshold
but agent b has an intimacy with i1 above the threshold, their
individual decisions on whether to grant access to i1 would
be different. A similar example can be constructed for the
case where the two policies are different but, because of the
individual intimacies of agents a and b to other agents in T ,
they suggest the same decision. Thus, we need to consider the
effects that each particular policy has on the set of target agents
T to determine whether or not the policies of two negotiating
agents are in conflict. That is, we need to know which agents
are granted/denied access by a given policy.
Privacy policies dictate a particular action to be performed
when an agent in T tries to access the item. The available
actions are usually either 0 (denying access) or 1 (granting
access). The action to perform according to a given privacy
policy is determined as follows:
Definition 3: Given an agent a ∈ Ag, its privacy policy
Pa = 〈θ1, . . . , θ|R|, E〉, and an agent i ∈ T , we define the
function5:
act(Pa, i) =
{
1 iff int(a, i) ≥ θr(a,i) ∧ i /∈ E
0 otherwise
We also consider so-called action vectors ~v ∈ {0, 1}n, i.e.
complete assignments of actions to all agents in T , so that vi
denotes the action for i ∈ T . When a privacy policy is applied
to T , it produces such an action vector:
Definition 4: The action vector induced by privacy policy P
in T is ~v = (v1, . . . , vn), where n =| T | and vi = act(P, i).
We now consider the following problem: agents a and b
have their own privacy policies for the same item, and the
effect of these policies leads to different action vectors, i.e.,
there are target agents who are granted access according to
one policy but denied access according to the other. In this
case, we say that these two privacy policies are in conflict:
Definition 5: Given agents a and b, their preferred privacy
policies for the item under negotiation Pa and Pb, and the
action vectors induced by Pa and Pb, which are ~v and ~w
respectively, we say that Pa and Pb are in conflict with respect
to the item under negotiation iff ~v 6= ~w.
Further, we say that the agents in conflict is the set C =
{i ∈ T | vi 6= wi}. The complexity of the conflict detection
mechanism isO(m·n), where m =| T | is the number of target
agents, and n =| N | is the number of negotiating agents.
Example 1: Suppose a set of agents Ag = {a, b, i1, i2,
i3, i4} and a unique relationship type among them R = {r1}.
Agents a and b are to decide which agents to grant access to
5This function will be different depending on the access control model
used. For instance, in group-based access control (like Facebook lists) this
function could be specified as:
act(Pa, i) =

1 iff i is in a group that is granted access and
i is not blocked individually
1 iff i is granted access individually
0 otherwise
4i1 i2 i3 i4
a 10 6 4 1
b 8 6 7 4
TABLE I
INTIMACIES FOR EXAMPLE 1.
a photo in which both of them are depicted, and the intimacy
values of agents a and b toward others are as shown in Table I,
with Y = 10. Suppose that agent a would prefer the policy
Pa = 〈5, ∅〉, so that ~v = (1, 1, 0, 0) — i.e., agent a wants
to grant access to agents i1 and i2, toward whom she has an
intimacy greater or equal to 5, but not to agents i3 and i4
who are less intimate to her. However, agent b would prefer
the policy Pb = 〈4, ∅〉, so that ~w = (1, 1, 1, 1) — i.e., agent b
wants to grant access to agents i1, i2, i3, and i4. As ~v 6= ~w,
Pa and Pb are in conflict and the set of agents in conflict is
C = {i3, i4}.
V. DEALS AND THEIR UTILITY
When agents run into a conflict, they can still negotiate a
common action vector for the item in question to achieve a
compromise, even if this will not result in an optimal policy
for either of them. Such an outcome (or deal) is simply an
action vector ~o ∈ {0, 1}n such that n =| T |, and the
negotiation space is the space of all such vectors, which agents
can rank according to utility functions that compactly reflect
agents’ preferences as will be defined in this section. Based on
these utility functions, agents will agree on a particular action
vector following the negotiation mechanism that we present
in Section VI.
A. From Deals to Local Policies
After agents agree on a particular action vector, they must
represent it in the form of a local privacy policy, so that
users could consult it without having to check who is granted
access or not individually. A particular action vector is likely
to be represented with different privacy policies for each agent
because each of them has different intimacies toward agents
in T . Also, it is crucial that the resulting privacy policies are
as simple (in terms of the number of exceptions they include)
as possible to ensure that users can understand them, which
is crucial for an appropriate privacy management [25]. For
instance, a privacy policy that includes 100 exceptions will be
far more difficult to read and understand by the user than a
privacy policy that only includes one exception. Thus, we are
interested in a privacy policy that minimises the number of
exceptions among all the privacy policies that can induce the
same action vector.
Definition 6: Given an action vector ~o, the privacy policy
that induces ~o in T and minimises the number of exceptions
is defined as:
P~o = arg min
P=〈θ1,...,θ|R|,E〉, ~v=~o
| E |
B. Utility Function
Intuitively, the rationale of the utility function agents will
use to rank possible negotiation outcomes is:
1) An outcome will be ranked based on the distance (in
terms of intimacy) between the agent’s preferred privacy
policy and the privacy policy that induces the outcome,
establishing an intimacy-based ordering of the outcomes
as suggested by [10]. That is, the farther the privacy
policy that induces the outcome is from the agent’s
preferred privacy policy, the less valued the outcome
will be.
2) An outcome will be ranked according to the number
of exceptions of the privacy policy that induces the
outcome, so that privacy policies should include as few
exceptions as possible to ensure readability and under-
standability. That is, the more exceptions the privacy
policy that induces the outcome entails, the less valued
the outcome will be.
We start defining the intimacy distance between two poli-
cies. Privacy policies may have different intimacy dimensions
(i.e., one per each relationship type considered), so that a
metric in the R|R| space is needed to compare them. We use
the Euclidean distance to measure the distance between two
policies as follows:
Definition 7: Given two policies P and Q the distance
between them is6:
d(P,Q) =
√∑
r∈R
(P.θr −Q.θr)2
The advantage of using Euclidean distance is that it is
sensitive to large variations in one dimension (relationship
type). For instance, for two policies with a large difference
in the “friends” relationship type (e.g., one of them grants any
acquaintances access and the other only grants access to close
friends) the distance would be large as well. This aligns with
empirical evidence that suggests that intimacy distance plays
a significant role on deciding to disclose or not [20], [12],
[9], [10], so the higher the intimacy distance between what
the user would like for a particular relationship type and the
intimacy between that user and a target user, the less the user
would like to share with the target use.
Other metrics that can be used to compare vectors in
the same space, such as the average of differences for each
relationship type, the Chebyshev distance or the Manhattan
distance do not always align with that. A simple average
of the differences of intimacy in each relationship type,
would lead to the final distance value being significantly
attenuated if the differences in other relationship types (e.g.,
“family”,“colleagues”, etc) are low. The Chebyshev distance is
the maximum of all distances in each dimension. This would
work well for the case in which there is a large variation on
only one dimension (which would be the maximum), but if
there are large variations in more than one dimension, this
would not be accounted as only the maximum would be
considered. In contrast, the Euclidean distance would clearly
pick this difference, so that the final distance would be higher
for the case in which there are large variations in more than
one dimension. Finally, the Manhattan distance is the sum
of the differences for all dimensions. Clearly, we could have
6An example of this function for group-based access control models could
be the euclidean distance but considering, for each possible group (instead
of for each possible relationship type), the distance between the minimum
intimacy of the users in this group that are granted access in the two policies
compared (instead of the difference between intimacy thresholds).
5small to medium variations in some dimensions that would
add up to the same value as if only one dimension had a large
variation. For instance, small variations in relationship types
friends, family, colleagues, etc, could give the same result that
a large variation in only one dimension (grant access to all
your work colleagues instead of only to those you are closer
to you), which would be clearly worse in terms of privacy
implications. Therefore, the intimacy distance would be unable
to catch these nuances, which might impact on how the utility
function is able to model user preferences in this domain.
We now define the utility function based on the privacy
policy that minimises the number of exceptions among all the
privacy policies that induce the same action vector (Def. 6)
and the intimacy distance (Def. 7).
Definition 8: Given agent a and its preferred privacy policy
Pa, the utility of an action vector ~o for agent a is:
ua(~o) = λa(P
~o) · (D − d(Pa, P~o))
In this equation, D accounts for the maximum possible dis-
tance between two privacy policies, which would be obtained
if the difference wss Y for all the relationship types, and
λa(P
~o) = 1− | P
~o.E |
| T |
accounts for the number of exceptions that P~o — the privacy
policy that induces ~o in T with the minimum possible excep-
tions, as defined above — would entail (denoted as | P~o.E |)
with respect to the maximum number of exceptions possible,
i.e., the number of target agents | T |.
Thus, although the utility of an outcome ~o is mainly based
on intimacy distance between policies Pa and P~o, it is also
weighted by a factor depending on the number of exceptions
that the resulting privacy policy P~o would entail.
VI. NEGOTIATION PROTOCOL
Next, we consider how a mutually acceptable action vector
~o can be agreed upon by two negotiating agents a, b ∈ N
for the particular item under negotiation. In order for a
and b to be able to negotiate a common action vector for
a given item, we need to define a negotiation mechanism.
A negotiation mechanism is composed of: (i) a negotiation
protocol, which is a means of standardising the communication
between participants in the negotiation process by defining
how the actors can interact with each other; and (ii) strategies
that agents can play over the course of a negotiation protocol
[15]. Negotiation protocols determine the strategies agents can
play during the execution of the negotiation protocol. Although
there are some negotiation protocols proposed in the related
literature [26], not all of them comply with the requirements
for the domain we are tackling in terms of the strategies they
permit. In particular, the requirements are:
• The protocol must permit negotiation strategies that are
stable. A stable strategy is one whereby if one agent is
playing it the others’ best strategy is to also play the
same strategy. This is very important, as it is expected
that each agent usually cares only about his user’s own
utility and will always try to play the strategy that can get
the highest utility, even if it means everyone else is much
worse [27]. This could clearly lead to outcomes in which
one agent gets an extremely high utility and everyone else
gets almost nothing, which would be unfair. Therefore,
stability is a very desirable property for our domain, as
the negotiation mechanism should be fair, so that one user
cannot just impose her preferences on the others.
• The protocol must permit negotiation strategies that con-
verge to the optimal solution (what is know in the nego-
tiation literature as efficiency). This is of crucial impor-
tance because of two main reasons: (i) if the negotiation
protocol does not allow negotiation strategies that make
the negotiation converge, agents could keep negotiating
forever; (ii) the preferences of all the negotiating agents’
users should be respected as much as possible.
The simplest negotiation protocol that has these properties is
the one-step protocol [15]. This protocol has only one round,
where the two agents propose a deal, and they must accept
the deal that maximises the product of both agents’ utilities.
In case deals have the same product, one of them is chosen
randomly (e.g. by flipping a coin). In our case, a deal is an
action vector. Thus, each agent will propose an action vector
and they will accept the one that maximises the product of
their utilities. To calculate individual utilities, agents use the
utility function presented in Section 4, which, in turn, uses the
agents’ preferred privacy policies elicited to detect conflicts
(as explained in Section 3), and agents’ intimacies, which can
be accurately estimated from content already published (as
explained in Section 2).
It was formally proven that the best strategy that agents
can follow in this protocol is to propose the deal (action
vector) that is best for themselves amongst those with maximal
product of utilities. This strategy is both stable and efficient
[15]. Its stability derives from being a Nash equilibrium (if one
of the two agents follows this strategy the other agent’s best
strategy is to also follow this strategy), no agent has anything
to gain by changing only his own strategy unilaterally. It is
efficient in the sense that if there exists a solution the agents
will find it using this strategy. Other negotiation protocols such
as the well-known monotonic concession protocol [15] or the
alternating offers protocol [28] do not allow strategies for this
domain that would be both stable and efficient. The monotonic
concession protocol is known to only allow strategies that can
be either stable or efficient but not both [29]. The alternating
offers protocol has no convergence guarantees in its basic
form, and for the time-dependent form utilities must be time-
dependent [27], which is not the case in this domain.
~o ua(~o) ub(~o) ua(~o)× ub(~o)
(1,1,0,0) 10 5 50
(1,1,0,1) 7.5 7.5 56.25
(1,1,1,0) 9 7.5 67.5
(1,1,1,1) 6 10 60
TABLE II
ACTION VECTOR UTILITIES FOR EXAMPLE 2.
Example 2: Consider the application of our negotiation
mechanism to resolve the conflicts detected in Example 1.
As the set of agents in conflict was C = {i3, i4}, the possible
action vectors that could be selected as a compromise are the
ones in Table II under the ~o column. Agents a and b will
6be able to rank each of the possible action vectors according
to their preferences by measuring the utility of the action
vectors, using the utility function from Definition 8, which
is calculated based on the preferred privacy policies of each
agent and the intimacies between the negotiating agents and
other target agents (shown in Table I). Table II shows, for each
action vector, the utilities for each individual agent as well as
the product of both agents’ utilities. For instance, the utility
of ~o = (1, 1, 1, 0) for a is ua(~o) = λa(~o) · (D − d(Pa, P~o)),
where:
• D = 10 because we only have one relationship type in
this example, so the maximum distance possible will be
the maximum possible intimacy value Y = 10 in our
example.
• P~o = 〈4, ∅〉 because this is the privacy policy that
represents the action vector ~o = (1, 1, 1, 0) for agent
a with the minimum number of exceptions. That is, all
target agents with an intimacy higher or equal than 4 are
granted access to the item under consideration.
• λa(~o) = 1, because P~o does not entail any exception.
• d(Pa, P~o) =
√
(Pa.θ − P~o.θ)2 =
√
(5− 4)2 = 1.
Thus, ua(~o = (1, 1, 1, 0)) = 1× (10− 1) = 9. Finally, agents
will propose the action vector that is most favourable to them
in terms of maximising the utility product. In our example,
both will propose ~o = (1, 1, 1, 0), which will be the outcome
of the negotiation.
A. Complexity
The number of possible deals in this setting is exponential in
the number of agents in C, the set of agents in conflict. This is
because the negotiation mechanism will have to consider 2|C|
possible outcomes (action vectors) in order to find the one
that maximises the product of utilities. However, the number
of agents in C will change from negotiation to negotiation
— it completely depends on the preferred policies of the
negotiating agents a and b, so that we cannot predict the
number of action vectors to be considered for each particular
case a priori, even though it seems clear that the more
target agents in T the more possibilities for the number of
agents in C to be higher. In the worst case, all of the target
agents T will be in C, i.e. the problem complexity grows
exponentially in the number of target agents. Moreover, each
possible outcome needs to be evaluated from the point of view
of the other negotiating agents. Therefore, the complexity of
the negotiation mechanism would be O(2l ·n), where l =| C |
is the number of conflicts, and n =| N | is the number
of negotiating agents. Finally, the worst case would be an
upper bound for the complexity, so that in the worst case the
complexity would be O(2m ·n), where m =| T | is the number
of target agents, and n =| N | is the number of negotiating
agents.
VII. HEURISTICS
To tackle the exponential blowup in the number of possible
deals, we firstly considered complete approaches that would
decrease the complexity while always finding the optimal
solution. In particular, we considered approaches such as dy-
namic programming (and other divide and conquer algorithms)
or branch and bound algorithms. However, none of these
approaches was suitable for this domain. This is because the
problem we are tackling does not exhibit the overlapping
subproblems and optimal substructure properties required for
a dynamic programming approach, and we were not able to
develop a complete BnB algorithm because we were unable to
find good-enough upper bounds in this domain for the utility
of partial action vectors. For instance, using the utility function
defined in Section 5 while ignoring target agents for whom no
decision has been made (the one used for the Greedy heuristic)
turned out to be too optimistic to prune enough nodes from
the search space, so that the resulting BnB algorithm was not
efficient enough to be used in practice.
As complete approaches were not possible, we decided
to develop heuristics — i.e., incomplete approaches — that
could reduce the number of action vectors considered when
maximising the utility product to only those that appear most
promising. This obviously involves a risk of losing optimality
— we empirically prove later on in Section VIII that these
optimality losses remain within acceptable levels in practice.
A. Distance-based Heuristic
Our first heuristic fixes the action to be taken for some
conflicting target agents without trying both possible actions
(granting or denying access) when generating the possible
action vectors.
Algorithm 1 Distance-based Heuristic - Agent a
Input: T , ~v, ~w, Pa, Pb, ϕ
Output: ~o
1: maxval← 0
2: initialize to zeros(~o)
3: initialize to zeros(~t)
4: for all i ∈ T do . Generating a partial action vector
5: if v[i] = w[i] then
6: t[i]← v[i]
7: else . Conflict - applying heuristic
8: da ←| Pa.θr(a,i) − int(a, i) |
9: db ←| Pb.θr(b,i) − int(b, i) |
10: if | da − db |≥ ϕ then
11: if da > db then
12: t[i]← v[i]
13: else
14: t[i]← w[i]
15: end if
16: else
17: t[i]← ∗ . Both will be considered
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: for all ~x ∈ X~t do . Utility product maximisation
22: prod← ua(~x)× ub(~x)
23: if prod > max then
24: ~o← ~x
25: max← prod
26: maxUT ← ua(~x)
27: end if
28: if prod = max and ua(~x) > maxUT then
29: ~o← ~x
30: maxUT ← ua(~x)
31: end if
32: end for
Informally speaking, the heuristic calculates how important
7assigning a particular action to a particular target agent is for
one of the negotiating agents. This importance is calculated by
measuring the intimacy distance between a target agent and the
threshold for the relationship type of this agent in the preferred
privacy policies of both agents a and b. If the difference
between these two distances is higher than a threshold value ϕ
— the so-called importance threshold — we consider that the
action for that target agent is more important to the negotiating
agent with higher distance than to the negotiating agent with
the lower distance. Thus, we only consider action vectors
in which the particular target agent is assigned the action
suggested by the negotiating agent with the highest distance.
Both negotiating agents are using the same ϕ value.
Algorithm 1 illustrates the proposal generation process with
the heuristic for agent a (the pseudocode for agent b would
be the same except for lines 27-30 as explained below). In
this algorithm, we use a so-called partial action vector ~t with
ti ∈ {0, 1, ∗}, where 0/1 means that action vectors generated
from that partial action vector will deny/grant target agent
i access and ∗ means that both actions will be considered
when generating action vectors. For each target agent i, if
both action vectors ~v and ~w assign the same action — i.e.
there is no conflict in the action to be taken for this particular
agent, then this action is chosen for the partial action vector.
If the action vectors do not assign the same action, we have
a conflict. In case of conflict, we first measure the distances
in intimacy of agent i to both agents a and b (Lines 11 and
12). If the difference between these two distances is greater
than or equal to the importance threshold ϕ, we apply the
action corresponding to the greater distance. If not, we assign
a ∗ value to consider both alternatives. In section VIII, we
discuss the effect of different importance thresholds ϕ on the
performance of the negotiation mechanism.
After the creation of the partial action vector, we only
consider action vectors that comply with the partial action
vector in the utility product maximisation step (from Line 21).
This set is defined as X~t = {~x | ∀i ∈ T, xi = ti ∨ ti = ∗}.
That is, we are constraining the set of action vectors considered
when maximising the product of utilities for both agents. In
Lines 22-26, if the product of utilities for the current action
vector is higher than for the best action vector seen so far,
agent a updates the latter with the current one. In Lines 27-30,
if the product of utilities for the current action vector is equal
to the product of utilities of the best action vector seen so far
and the individual utility for agent a is higher for the current
action vector than for the best action vector seen so far, agent
a updates the best action action vector with the current one.
This is because, as explained in the previous section, the best
strategy that agents can follow in this protocol is to propose
the deal (action vector) that is best for themselves among those
with a maximal product of utilities. Lines 26, 28, and 30 will
change for agent b to consider its individual utility instead of
the individual utility of agent a.
B. Greedy Heuristic
Our second heuristic follows a greedy approach to propose
an action (granting/denying access) for each conflict sepa-
rately. The informal idea is to make the locally optimal choice
at each stage with the hope of finding a global optimum.
Like the previous heuristic, this one also considers partial
action vectors. Here, however, agents also calculate the utility
of partial action vectors, because the greedy heuristic needs an
estimation of how good the partial action vectors generated in
each step of the heuristic are. To this aim, the utility function
defined in Section V is used while ignoring target agents for
whom no decision has been made so far, i.e. where the partial
action vector contains ∗ at the entry corresponding to the
respective target agent. This is done by considering that the
action assigned to them is the most desired by each negotiating
agent. In this way, the utility of a partial action vector acts as
an upper bound of the utility that will be achieved when having
a complete action vector.
Algorithm 2 Greedy Heuristic - Agent a
Input: T , ~v, ~w, Pa, Pb
Output: ~o
1: for all i ∈ T do . Detecting Conflicts
2: if v[i] = w[i] then
3: o[i]← v[i]
4: else
5: o[i]← ∗
6: C ← C ∪ {i}
7: end if
8: end for
9:
10: while C 6= ∅ do
11: maxV al← 0
12: ~x← ~o
13: for all i ∈ C do . For all the remaining conflicts
14: for action ∈ {0, 1} do
15: x[i]← action
16: prod = ua(~x)× ub(~x)
17: if prod > max then
18: max← prod
19: maxUT ← ua(~x)
20: maxTarget← i
21: maxAction← x[i]
22: end if
23: if prod = max and ua(~x) > maxUT then
24: maxUT ← ua(~x)
25: maxTarget← i
26: maxAction← x[i]
27: end if
28: end for
29: x[i]← ∗
30: end for
31: o[maxTarget] = maxAction
32: C ← C \ {maxTarget}
33: end while
The heuristic starts by considering the action vector in
which all agents not in conflict are assigned the corresponding
(commonly agreeable) action, and all other agents are assigned
a ∗ value. Thus, this first partial action vector always has the
maximum product of utilities possible with respect to the other
possible partial action vectors and complete action vectors.
This is because if we ignore all conflicts, the actions assigned
to the target agents will completely comply with the preferred
privacy policies of the negotiating agents.
After this, the heuristic incrementally assigns an action to
one conflict at a time. The choice of the conflict and the action
taken to resolve it is made as follows: the heuristic compares
all possible grant/deny configurations over all conflicts and
greedily chooses the most promising option, i.e. the one that
8decreases the total product of utilities by the smallest amount.
This process is repeated until all conflicts are resolved and a
complete action vector has been produced.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode for the greedy heuristic
for agent a (the pseudocode for agent b would be the same
except lines 19, 23, and 24 would change for agent b to
consider its individual utility instead of the individual utility
of agent a). We first detect conflicts and create a partial action
vector by assigning either the corresponding action to the
agents not in conflict or ∗ to the agents that are in conflict
(lines 1-8). Then, while there are conflicts that have not been
dealt with (line 10), we assign an action to a conflict, one
conflict at a time. To achieve this, we try all possible partial
action vectors by exploring 0 and 1 values for each of the
conflicts (lines 13-24). Then, we select the conflict and action
that maximise the product of utilities. Finally, we update the
partial action vector with the selected action for the conflict
in question and mark that conflict as resolved (lines 31-32).
C. GreedyBnB Heuristic
Our third heuristic is GreedyBnB and it is loosely based
on Branch and Bound (BnB) algorithms. These algorithms
systematically discard large subsets of fruitless candidates
from the search space by means of upper and lower estimated
bounds of the quantity being optimised. Our GreedyBnB
heuristic operates in a similar way to a BnB algorithm7.
Informally speaking, the GreedyBnB heuristic explores other
branches of the search space different from the one followed
by the greedy heuristic. The aim is to explore branches of
the search space that were discarded by the greedy heuristic
at early stages and that could lead to better outcomes. The
GreedyBnB heuristic uses the greedy heuristic as a selection
algorithm to prioritise options. In particular, our GreedyBnB
uses the Greedy heuristic to estimate a lower bound for the
utility of partial action vectors. That is, given a partial action
vector, we estimate its utility to be, at least, the utility of the
solution obtained when the greedy heuristic is applied to that
partial action vector.
Algorithm 3 lists our GreedyBnB heuristic. Firstly, it con-
structs a partial action vector ~t with all the conflicts detected
(Lines 1-7). Secondly, it uses the greedy heuristic to obtain
a solution to the partial action vector created (Line 9). Then,
it adds the partial action vector, the greedy solution and its
utility to the list L (Line 10), which is ordered by decreasing
values of utility of the greedy solution obtained. While L is
not empty, we retrieve the first element of the ordered list.
If this has higher utility than the best solution seen so far,
the solution is recorded as the best one seen so far and all the
nodes in the list that have less utility are pruned (Lines 14-18).
After this, we generate all the possible partial action vectors
that arise from considering the possible actions (granting/1 or
denying/0) for all the remaining conflicts in the partial action
7As explained above, a complete BnB algorithm was not implemented
because we were unable to find good-enough upper bounds in this domain
for the utility of partial action vectors. Nonetheless, we followed some of
the BnB principles to develop the GreedyBnB heuristic, but of course, as
a heuristic this approach is incomplete — there are no guarantees that the
optimal solution will always be found.
Algorithm 3 GreedyBnB Heuristic - Agent a
Input: T , ~v, ~w, Pa, Pb
Output: ~o
1: for all i ∈ T do . Detecting Conflicts
2: if v[i] = w[i] then
3: t[i]← v[i]
4: else
5: t[i]← ∗
6: end if
7: end for
8:
9: {~o,maxV al} = greedySolution(~t ) . Obtain a solution with greedy
heuristic
10: L.add({~t, ~o,maxV al})
11:
12: while L is not empty do . Explore other possible solutions
13: {~x, ~y, ut} ← L.removeF irst()
14: if ut > maxV al or (ut = maxV al and ua(~y) > ua(~o)) then
15: maxV al← ut
16: ~o← ~y
17: L.prune(maxV al)
18: end if
19: for all i ∈ conflicts(~x) do
20: for action ∈ {0, 1} do
21: x[i]← action
22: {ut, ~y} = greedySolution(~x)
23: if ut > maxV al or (ut = maxV al and ua(~y) > ua(~o))
then
24: L.add({~x, ~y, ut})
25: end if
26: end for
27: x[i]← ∗
28: end for
29: end while
vector retrieved from the list (Lines 19-28). If the greedy
solution for any of these partial action vectors produces a
higher utility than the best solution seen so far, we add this
partial action vector (which will have one conflict less than the
partial action vector retrieved from the list), its greedy solution
and the utility of the solution to the ordered list (Lines 22-25).
Finally, it is worth noting that the GreedyBnB heuristic can
also be implemented in a similar way to anytime algorithms.
These algorithms can be interrupted before they end but will
still provide a valid solution if interrupted, and are expected
to produce increasingly good solutions the more time they are
given to run. In particular, we could implement the heuristic so
that it stops after a given amount of time, and this is explored
further below in Section VIII. When the heuristic stops, it will
return the best solution seen so far. In the experiments section
we describe the performance achieved with the heuristic at
various cutoff points.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We conducted a series of experiments to compare the
performance of our proposed negotiation mechanism with and
without heuristics empirically by measuring the number of
action vectors considered and the execution time required to
find a solution, as well as the maximum product of utilities
obtained.
A. Experimental Setting
We implemented our mechanism and heuristics in Java and
report experiments conducted on a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i5 iMac
9with 8 GB RAM. The rationale for the parameters explained
below was the following: wherever we knew the real value
or distribution of one of the parameters in real Social Media
we used that to inform the values considered; and if we did
not know the real value of distribution of the parameters
considered then we used a different random value for each
experiment conducted. For the possible set of parameters, we
performed 1000 different experiments in order to support the
findings with statistically significant evidence.
We considered 3 relationship types in line with related
literature on online communities and social networks [30],
[31]. Besides, we considered different numbers of target agents
— 10 to 200 in increments of 10 — based on typical real-
world values, given that the average user on Facebook has 130
friends [4]. We also considered a maximum intimacy value Y
of 10, i.e. an intimacy range of [0,10]. Note that the maximum
intimacy value does not have any effect on the performance
of the mechanism, as it just defines a range of real values for
the possible intimacy values. If another range of real values
is used, the intimacy values would be scaled but the results
would be the same in terms of the solution agreed.
For the parameters we did not have the real data, we just
randomised them. That is, we generated a random matrix
of intimacies among agents, random assignment of agents to
relationship types, and random privacy policies for both nego-
tiating agents. Moreover, we ensured that for each situation,
there was at least one conflict — if not, we reinitialised the
matrix and privacy policies until at least one conflict occurred.
After this, we ran the negotiation mechanism with and
without heuristics to obtain the solution to this situation and
accounted for the number of action vectors each approach
needed to explore and, where available, the utility of the
solution achieved and the execution time needed to achieve the
solution. As explained below, there were situations in which
not all the approaches were able to produce an actual solution
in reasonable time.
Finally, when using the mechanism with heuristics, we var-
ied the parameters of the particular heuristic should they have
one. The heuristics that can be parametrised are the distance-
based heuristic and the GreedyBnB heuristic. For the distance-
based heuristic one can use a different importance threshold
ϕ as described in Section 7.1. In particular, we show the
performance of different values for this parameter in Sections
8.2, 8.3, and 8.4. This values were ϕ = {0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
Higher values for the importance threshold did not remove
enough action vectors and took approximately the same time
as the mechanism without heuristics, while lower values for
the importance threshold had too much utility loss. Regarding
the GreedyBnB heuristic, it can be interrupted before it ends
but will still provide a valid solution if interrupted as described
in Section 7.3 — though it is expected to produce increasingly
good solutions the more time they are given to run. In section
8.5, we illustrate the performance achieved with the heuristic
at various cutoff points (after 30, 50, 100, 200, and 500 ms).
More cutoff points were considered, but these were the most
representative ones to be shown in the figures.
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B. Number of Action Vectors
We measured the number of action vectors to come up with
a reasonable estimate of expected execution time, because for
more than 40 target agents the experiments where heuristics
were not used would not finish after 7 days running. This indi-
cated that without heuristic pruning the negotiation mechanism
is not usable in practice. Figure 2 shows the average number of
action vectors (including partial action vectors when using the
heuristics) that each approach would need to consider to solve
the problem given a number of agents. The plot also shows
that the lower ϕ for the distance-based heuristic, the lower the
number of action vectors considered. This is because for low
ϕ values more actions are detected as being more important
for one negotiating agent than for the other, so fewer action
vectors are generated. We can also observe that both Greedy
and GreedyBnB perform similarly, though Greedy considers
fewer action vectors. Obviously, GreedyBnB requires more
action vectors because it needs to invoke the Greedy heuristics
several times to compute a solution.
C. Utility
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Figure 3 shows the percentage of utility lost when using
heuristics compared to the optimal solution. All heuristics have
an impact on optimality, but the best results are obtained with
the GreedyBnB heuristic and the distance-based heuristic with
ϕ = 4. However, if we consider the number of action vectors
needed considered before returning a solution (as shown in
Figure 2), the GreedyBnB heuristic is the one that generally
offers the best tradeoff between number of action vectors and
utility loss. Moreover, in order to determine how well the
heuristics scale when increasing the number of target agents,
Figure 4 shows the total product of utilities achieved by each
approach. For ϕ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} we had the same problem as
without use of any heuristic, i.e., we could not obtain results in
reasonable time for more than a small number of target agents.
In contrast to this, the Greedy and GreedyBnB heuristics
scale by far better and clearly outperform the distance-based
heuristic with ϕ = 0.5, which prunes enough action vectors
to produce results in reasonable time for all numbers of
target agents considered. We can also observe that when the
number of targets increases, GreedyBnB loses less percent of
utility with respect to the optimal one. Finally, we can also
observe that GreedyBnB clearly outperforms Greedy in terms
of utility. Greedy algorithms mostly (but not always) fail to
find the globally optimal solution, because they usually do
not exhaustively consider the whole space, and may make
commitments to certain choices too early, which prevent them
from finding the best overall solution later. Using GreedyBnB,
we consider branches of the search space that were initially
discarded by Greedy which usually leads to finding a better
solution. However, exploring more branches of the search
space also comes at a cost — as we have seen previously,
GreedyBnB obviously needs to consider many more action
vectors than Greedy. In the following section, we assess the
difference between these two in terms of actual execution time.
Finally, we sought to assess the quality of the results ob-
tained in terms of to what extent individual privacy preferences
were being covered. To this aim, we also considered what is
the minimum utility achieved among negotiating agents for
each deal, i.e., which is the utility for the negotiating agent
that is least favoured in the negotiation. Figure 5 shows the
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minimum utility achieved among negotiating agents for each
deal considering different numbers of target agents, and heuris-
tic and non-heuristic approaches. We can see that, without
heuristics, the negotiating agent that ends up with the lowest
utility will always have a utility of at least 7.5. Considering
the utility function (Definition 8) and the maximum intimacy
value Y of 10, the maximum utility that negotiating agents
can achieve is 10, though this would only be for the case that
the deal chosen is the one that favours them the most, which
is not possible as compromises are usually done to achieve
an agreement. Therefore, without heuristics the least favoured
negotiating agent has always at least 75% of their preferences
covered — in other words, it will only lose at most 25% in
utility. Moreover, this increases to ≈ 78% as the number of
target agents increases, because there are more opportunities to
find better compromises. Regarding the use of the mechanism
with heuristics, the GreedyBnB is again the best heuristic, so
that the mechanism with that heuristic provides roughly the
same values as the mechanism without heuristics.
D. Execution Time
As we were able to obtain results in reasonable time for
all the possible configurations when Greedy and GreedyBnB
heuristics were used, we were able to compare them in terms
of execution time to complement the results obtained in terms
of number of action vectors needed to compute a solution. We
obviated the distance-based heuristic here because we were
only able to obtain results in reasonable time with ϕ = 0.5,
but with this ϕ value, the heuristic produced results that are
very far from the optimal (up to more than 30%).
Figure 4 shows execution times for the Greedy and
GreedyBnB heuristics. We can observe that, from 120 target
agents upwards, the GreedyBnB heuristic takes more than
≈ 100 seconds to compute a solution while the Greedy
heuristic needs less than 30ms. Clearly, adding 100 seconds to
the process of posting an item could be considers too much for
users of social media. However, the Greedy heuristic, which
would be fast enough, usually implies a loss of utility of
around 10%. Thus, use of any of these two heuristics might
be ultimately unsuitable for implementation in a practical tool
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to resolve actual privacy policy conflicts in social media. Can
we find a method that lies somewhere “between” these two
that better balances the tradeoff between execution time and
optimality?
E. Exploiting GreedyBnB anytime capabilities
To come up with such a method, we repeated the ex-
periments, this time exploiting the anytime capabilities of
GreedyBnB. In particular, we limited the available compu-
tation time to a specific bound as suggested in section VII,
i.e., we stopped looking for further possible solutions after a
given amount of time elapsed.
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Figure 5 shows the utility achieved for some temporal
bounds compared to that obtained using the unbounded version
of GreedyBnB. It also shows the results for the Greedy heuris-
tic as a lower bound for the utility achieved. As expected,
the more time GreedyBnB is given, the better the results
obtained. Importantly, we can see that with 500ms the results
obtained would be very similar to unbounded GreedyBnB, and
much better than those achieved using the Greedy heuristic.
For instance, for 200 agents the difference between running
unbounded GreedyBnB (with a runtime of 100 seconds) and
its bounded version limited to 500ms is less than 3%.
F. Discussion
The main conclusion from our experiments is that the
negotiation mechanism cannot be used in practice for realistic
numbers of target agents without the complexity reduction
provided by our heuristics. For 200 target agents, for example,
we would need to consider ≈ 1050 action vectors. Moreover,
although for a limited number of target agents the distance-
based heuristic performs well for some parameter choices, the
greedy-based heuristics generally outperforms it both in terms
of complexity reduction and in terms of loss of utility, at least
for larger numbers of agents. In particular, using the greedy
heuristic seems to achieve very good results regarding the
number of action vectors considered and execution time —
for 200 agents it would consider only ≈ 103 action vectors
and would take 30ms, for example — while incurring a loss
of optimality that could acceptable: the heuristics would allow
us to reach agreement with 200 target agents while sacrificing
only around 10% of utility compared to the non-heuristic
version of the algorithm. Using the GreedyBnB heuristic
achieves outstanding results in terms of loss of optimality
but is worse than Greedy in terms of the number of action
vectors considered and execution time required. However,
choosing the appropriate parameters to bound the execution
time of GreedyBnB seems to achieve the best tradeoff between
optimality and execution time. For instance, for 200 agents the
bounded version of GreedyBnB would sacrifice only around
3% of the utility obtained while taking only 500ms, which
seems to be fast enough for actual use in common social media
applications.
IX. RELATED WORK
Over the last few years, many studies have been devoted
to improving user privacy in social media. Until now, these
mechanisms have often been shown not to effectively protect
privacy and sensitive information [32], [33]. To address this
problem, many approaches have recently emerged, e.g. [6],
[7], [16], [34]. In particular, AI and Multi-agent Systems
approaches have been suggested as appropriate to control
socio-technical systems like social media [35] and as a foun-
dation for social computing[36]. Such et al. [14] present an
extensive review of agent and Multi-agent Systems approaches
that deal with preserving privacy. An example of these kind
of approaches to manage privacy in Social Media is the
work of Krupa and Vercouter [37], [38], which proposes an
agent-based framework to control information flows in Social
Networks. Another example is the work of Ko¨kciyan and
Yolum [39], which proposed an agent-based framework for
privacy management and detection of violations based on
commitments. Finally, Such et al. [40] proposed the first agent-
based mechanism to decide whether personal information
is shared and with whom based on information-theoretic
measures of intimacy and privacy . However, all of these
approaches do not consider the problem of items that may
affect more than one user, and do not support multiple users
agreeing on to whom these items are shared. Therefore, these
approaches do not consider the privacy preferences of all of
the users affected by an item when deciding to whom and
whether or not information is shared.
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Few works have actually been proposed to deal with the
problem of collaboratively defining privacy policies for shared
items between two or more users of a social media site. We
shall discuss them and how they relate to our work in the
following paragraphs.
Wishart et al. [41] propose a method to define privacy
policies collaboratively. Their approach is based on a collabo-
rative definition of privacy policies in which all of the parties
involved can define strong and weak preferences. They define
a privacy language to specify users’ preferences in the form of
strong and weak conditions, and they detect privacy conflicts
based on them. However, this approach does not involve any
automated method to resolve conflicts, only some suggestions
that users may want to consider consider when they try to
resolve such conflicts manually.
The work described in [42] is based on an incentive mech-
anism where users are rewarded with a quantity of numeraire
each time they share information or acknowledge other users
(called co-owners) who are affected by the same item. When
there are conflicts among co-owners’ policies, the use of the
Clark Tax mechanism is suggested, where users can spend
their numeraire bidding for the policy that is best for them. As
stated in [43], the usability of this approach may be limited,
because users could have difficulties in comprehending the
mechanism and specify appropriate bid values in auctions.
Moreover, the auction process adopted in their approach
implies that only the winning bid determines who will be able
to access the data, instead of accommodating all stakeholders’
privacy preferences.
In [43], users must manually define their trust to other
users, the sensitivity that each of the items has for them,
and their general privacy concern. Then, the authors use these
parameters to calculate two main measures, privacy risk and
sharing loss. In particular, they calculate the privacy risk
and the sharing loss on what they call segments — in our
terminology, a segment equals the set of agents in conflict
— as a whole, i.e. all of the agents in these segments are
assigned the action preferred by either one party or the other
in the negotiation. That is, in our terminology only two action
vectors — ~v and ~w induced by the privacy policies Pa and Pb
respectively — are considered, and the action vector chosen
is the one that maximises the tradeoff between privacy risk
and sharing loss. Clearly, not considering other possible action
vectors could lead to outcomes that are far from optimal.
Finally, there are also related approaches based on voting
in the literature [44], [45], [46]. In these cases, a third party
collects the decision to be taken (granting/denying) for a
particular friend from each party. Then, the authors propose to
aggregate a final decision based on one voting rule (majority,
veto, etc.). However, the rule to be applied is either fixed [44],
[45] or is chosen by the user that uploads the item [46]. The
problem with this is that the solution to the conflicts then
becomes a unilateral decision (being taken by a third-party
or by the user that uploads the item) and, thus, there is no
room for users to actually negotiate and achieve compromise
themselves. Moreover, in the latter case, it might actually be
quite difficult for the user that uploads the item to anticipate
which voting rule would produce the best result without
knowing the preferences of the other users.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We presented an automated method for detecting and re-
solving privacy policy conflicts in social media applications.
To resolve conflicts, we proposed the use of an automated
negotiation mechanism. This mechanism is based on the
intimacy among agents, which determines the utility of other
agents’ proposals. In using intimacy as the determining factor
for utility, we followed the findings of most empirical studies
with real users, which confirm that it is the main factor
that influences their behaviour with regard to setting privacy
policies. This suggests that our approach is sound in terms of
modelling real users’ preferences.
Moreover, in order to reduce the complexity of the ne-
gotiation mechanism proposed, we proposed three heuristics
and showed through an experimental evaluation comparing the
performance of the negotiation mechanism proposed with and
without heuristics that: (i) use of the negotiation mechanism
is not practicable without heuristics; (ii) the distance-based
heuristic only performs well for a limited number of target
agents; (iii) the greedy heuristic offers good tradeoffs between
complexity and optimality when scaling up the number of
target agents; and (iv) the best heuristic overall is GreedyBnB
with a time bound. In particular, GreedyBnB bounded to
500ms would sacrifice only 3% in optimality in our exper-
iments.
The research presented in this article is a stepping stone
towards automated privacy policy negotiation. An interesting
future line of research would be to consider the fact that
disclosing items can also make relationships evolve [40],
which could play a role in shaping users’ preferences about
disclosure and negotiation outcomes. Finally, we would also
like to extend our mechanism in order to consider the intimacy
between the negotiating parties, which is known to influence
negotiation strategies and, in particular, may determine to what
extent negotiating parties are willing to concede during a
negotiation [47].
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